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From Nazi Legacy to Cold War: British Perceptions of European Identity, 1945-
54  
 
In August 1946 an article in Picture Post drew attention to the sufferings of 
Germans in the aftermath of the Second World War (Jacobson 1946). It prompted this 
response from Mrs. Jackson — a reader in Redcar, Yorkshire:  
 
We had Germans for six years, and it’s still Germans, and Germany, 
and we in England are heartily sick and tired of hearing about them. 
They got more than their fair share of everything when the war was on 
by plundering other countries. No wonder they say they were better 
fed then than they are now. How soon they forget!1 
 
Mrs. Jackson’s protest centres on the publication of any article on Germany — she 
goes on to ask Picture Post to provide her with lighter and more entertaining fare. But 
even though she wants no reminders of the war, she also censures Germans for 
forgetting they inflicted suffering on others, placing memories of war at the centre of 
her judgement on their sufferings.  
 
There is a considerable historiographical consensus that the Second World 
War reinforced a sense of detachment from continental Europe through a particular 
memory.  Kenneth Morgan argues: ‘Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, the image of 
‘standing alone’ and subsequently saving a stricken continent from itself went deep 
into British folk memories’ (Morgan 1993, 42-3). David Reynolds calls this ‘the 
enduring mentalité of 1940’, when, according to national myth, Britain severed itself 
from ‘perfidious continentals’. This myth, he argues, ‘animated a generation of 
Britons who had been through the dark days of Hitler’s war’ producing ‘an abiding 
suspicion of the continent — or even contempt’ (Reynolds 2003, 163). Malcolm 
Smith similarly notes 1940 as a defining moment that endured in British collective 
memory: ‘France’s defeat, and Britain’s subsequent survival, not only worked to 
confirm Britain’s sense of innate national superiority but also helped to cement a 
more general distrust of European entanglements for generations’ (Smith 2000, 40. 
See also, Garton Ash 2006, 455, Reynolds 1990, 348-9, Weight 2002, 101). 
 
Such emphasis on an enduring time-warp dominated by memories of 1940, 
however significant these were, takes little account of subsequent developments and 
the diversity of post-war meanings of the continent. Even in wartime, the story of 
European resistance, told prolifically across all media from 1941, drew heavily on 
traditional associations of Europe and civilisation. Its message, encapsulated in the 
slogan of the ‘V for Victory’ campaign — ‘Europe against the Germans’ — set 
Germany, not Britain, outside the family of European nations. Reporting of the 
liberation of concentration camps strengthened an opposition between European 
civilisation and German barbarism that was central to the resistance narrative. But in 
the aftermath of war the meanings assigned to the continent were volatile and in the 
late 1940s drew on another association with a considerable history: Europe as a place 
of war and of the threat of war.  
 
This chapter focuses on three moments in the development of British media 
narratives of Europe, in each case considering the place of Germany within imagery 
of the wider continent. The first is April 1945 when reporting of the liberation of 
concentration camps clearly identified Germany as the perpetrator of war crimes that 
produced what the Times called ‘tormented Europe’.2 The second, beginning in 
September 1945, saw some erosion of this opposition. An increasing emphasis not 
only on German suffering but also on wartime collaboration and post-war corruption 
in imagery of the wider continent meant that ideas about Germany and Europe 
increasingly converged. In the third moment from the late 1940s, an emergent Cold 
War narrative became familiar, particularly through the metaphor that Winston 
Churchill borrowed from the stage and first used six months before Mrs. Jackson 
wrote her letter: ‘Iron Curtain’ (Wright 2007). Widely taken up by journalists and 
politicians, this metaphor dramatised the post-war divisions of Europe and identified a 
new enemy — the Soviet Union.  
 
There is a substantial literature on British perceptions of the Nazi legacy of 
suffering in Europe — both official and popular — particularly on concentration 
camps and war crimes trials (Kushner 1991, Reilly et al. 1997, Bloxham 2001, Frank 
2006, Ramsden 2006). There has also been increasing recent acknowledgement of the 
impact of the Cold War on British culture and identity and a developing literature on 
its cultural dimensions (Shaw 2001, Jones 2005, Contemporary British History 2005). 
But these literatures have generally developed separately while stories of the Nazi 
legacy and the Cold War circulated simultaneously in the late 1940s. What was their 
impact on perceptions of Europe? What was the relationship between British attitudes 
to Germany and to the wider continent? In addressing these questions this chapter 
explores the post-war meanings of the continent and of British-European relations 
from the closing months of war to the mid-1950s. It argues that Britain engaged with 
many ‘Europes’ beyond ‘perfidious continentals’.  
 Civilised Europe  
 
In 1945 a film about Nazi concentration camps was shown at all German 
prisoner-of-war camps in Great Britain and Northern Ireland: part of a wider 
programme by the Political War Executive (PWE) — a propaganda unit of the 
Foreign Office — to re-educate German prisoners. Although the American Office of 
War Information supplied the film, the PWE requested some modifications to the 
commentary and the addition of extra shots showing a British Parliamentary 
delegation visiting Buchenwald. A report in August 1945 recorded that 202,404 
German prisoners had attended screenings, involving 1,580 performances given by 
film projector vans. An introduction to the film, addressed to the prisoners, told them:  
 
You will see in these pictures one of the reasons why Germany earned the hate 
and justifiable contempt of the whole world, and why she herself must do 
penance to atone for her irreparable guilt. No excuses such as “We didn’t know 
about it” or “ We couldn’t do anything about it” will release you from the moral 
responsibility which must be borne by every German.3 
 
Extensive newspaper, magazine and newsreel coverage conveyed a similar 
message to the British public, generally delivering a verdict of collective guilt. The 
Daily Mirror declared: ‘A race which can produce so much foulness must itself be 
foul’, and gave the label ‘stupid soft-hearts’ to readers who attempted to draw 
distinctions between ‘the Nazi war-makers and torturers and the German people’.4 
Gallup Polls that asked: ‘How do you feel about the German people, apart from their 
leaders’ recorded 54% saying ‘do not like’ in February 1945, but by April 1946 this 
had increased to 59%. Despite the idea of collective guilt, much reporting 
nevertheless individuated Germans, especially Josef Kramer the Belsen camp 
commandant and Irma Grese, the SS guard who were widely named the ‘Beast’ and 
‘Bitch’ of Belsen’.5  
 
A view of the Second World War as a conflict between civilisation and 
barbarism, focusing on German barbarism, was apparent in much wartime 
propaganda. ‘Hun’ — the term by which the German enemy was popularly known 
during the First World War — was banned by the BBC in 1937, but widely used after 
1939 and much favoured by Winston Churchill in his wartime speeches.6 In 1944, 
Churchill sent a telegram to Bernard Bracken at the Ministry of Information to request 
that, since the name ‘Aachen’ was ‘pure Hun’, the BBC should use its French name 
— Aix la Chapelle — when they announced its capture. Bracken’s reply assured him 
that the BBC would make use of the ‘more civilised term’.7 The notion of Sonderweg 
— a peculiar path taken by German history — linked barbarism to Prussian and 
German traditions, offering an account of German history in which the Second World 
War was just one more episode in an epic tale of aggression, militarism and 
destruction rooted in the character of German people. Reporting of the concentration 
camps presented evidence of their horrors as the final vindication of the view that 
Germans were inherently barbarous and cruel. The Daily Mail concluded its reporting 
of the liberation of Buchenwald and Belsen: ‘These are the Germans’.8 The British 
Paramount newsreel on Belsen was entitled ‘Proof Positive’.9 With some exceptions, 
such as the Manchester Guardian, there were few references to Nazi racial ideology 
or its victims: Jews, Roma, Slavs. 
 Belsen, as the only concentration camp to be liberated by the British, received 
the lion’s share of British media attention. In contrast to the individuation of the 
‘Beast’ and ‘Bitch’ of Belsen, concentration camp victims — both the dead and 
survivors — generally remained unindividuated and undifferentiated and were 
referred to collectively as ‘inmates’, ‘slave labourers’, ‘prisoners’, and sometimes 
‘political prisoners’. But The Man From Belsen, broadcast in 1946, featured Harold le 
Druillenec who, as a Channel Islander, had lived in the only British territory occupied 
by Germany before his deportation. In December 1945, le Druillenec sent loyal 
greetings from the empire and Commonwealth to the King on radio, just before the 
King’s Christmas broadcast. In The Man from Belsen, he reconstructed his 
experiences from arrest to liberation.10 Such a focus on a British victim suggested a 
tendency to nationalise a story in which everything about Belsen bespoke the 
difference between Britain as a tolerant and decent nation — its soldiers shown caring 
for concentration camp victims — and Germany. Richard Dimbleby was the first 
reporter into Belsen. He concluded his radio broadcast for the BBC: 
 
May I add to this story only the assurance that everything that an army can do to 
save these men and women and children is being done and that those officers 
and men who have seen these things have gone back to the Second Army 
moved to an anger such as I have never seen in them before (Dimbleby 1975, 
193).  
 
If reporting from Belsen tended to focus on British civilisation, an editorial in 
the Daily Mail set this in a wider European context. Deploying the notion of 
Sonderweg to place Germany firmly outside European traditions, it argued that a 
‘German shadow’ had darkened Europe for a century. The concentration camps 
showed that: ‘the terror inside Germany has reached a point which could not even 
have been imagined by the peoples who have inherited the humane civilisations of the 
West … because the course of their history has divorced them from the humanities 
deriving from Greece and Rome’.11 The introduction to the film shown to prisoners-
of-war in 1945 conveyed a similar message: ‘When you begin to be informed of your 
crimes … you will understand that the journey back from this barbarism — the truth 
of which has been proved by events in Germany in 1945 — to civilisation and to a 
useful membership of the European family of nations, is no short and quick one, but 
one which is marked by many periods of trial’.12  
 
In the aftermath of the liberation of concentration camps, the contrast between 
Germany and Europe focused on sufferings inflicted by Germany. Reports that 
millions were starving in Holland and that the flooding unleashed by the German 
army would further increase the famine closely followed the revelations about 
concentration camps in April 1945. An editorial in the Times speaking of ‘tormented 
Europe’ noted that the people of western Holland had ‘been brought down almost to 
concentration camp level’.13 Widespread protests at the treatment of German 
prisoners-of-war in Britain who, under the Geneva convention, received the same 
rations as their soldier captors, focused chiefly on the disparity this caused between 
prisoners-or-war and British civilians working together, where Germans ate better 
than their British fellow-workers. But a cartoon in the Mirror captioned ‘Surely the 
waiters weren’t intended to starve’, pointed the contrast between well-fed German 
prisoners-of-war and suffering Europe. A waiter presents two fat German soldiers 
with a menu of dishes ‘designed by the Geneva Convention’. He is bent, haggard and 
emaciated and the napkin draped over his arm bears the legend ‘Starving Europe’.14  
 
The Times editorial that spoke of ‘tormented Europe’ hoped for a quick 
surrender by Germany, but it also outlined Germany’s condition as comparable to the 
rest of Europe: collapsed and ruined. The incorporation of Germany into a generalised 
image of a continent characterised by hunger and disease was qualified by the view 
that Germans had brought upon themselves their own ruination. But it foreshadowed 
an increasing tendency in the late 1940s to blur the distinction between Germans as 
perpetrators of violence and other Europeans as their innocent victims in a generalised 
image of a continent that was suffering, chaotic, corrupt and threatening. 
 
Suffering, Chaotic and Threatening Europe 
 
In The Lost People — a British feature film released in 1949 — Captain 
Ridley (Dennis Price) gestures around a former theatre in Germany, now converted 
into a dispersal centre for refugees under British administration where Ridley is the 
officer in charge. The war is over, but it has made millions of Europeans into 
refugees. ‘Something we’ll never see again’, Ridley tells his Sergeant (William 
Hartnell), ‘the whole of Europe under one roof’.15 
 
From 1946, as war crimes trials were held and the extent of wartime and post-
war displacement became apparent through the millions of Europeans who ended the 
war in displaced persons (DP) camps, reporting of the liberation of concentration 
camps was quickly succeeded by attention to the Nazi legacy. As the perpetrator of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity as well as the site of war crimes trials and of 
many DP camps, Germany was at the centre of these stories. Mrs. Jackson wanted to 
hear no more of Germany in 1946, but her letter was published in an edition of 
Picture Post with a 4-page spread on ‘The Greatest Trial in History’: Nuremberg. 
 
Imagery of DP camps in Germany and Austria produced a generalised image 
of Europe in which suffering was a prominent theme and women were foregrounded. 
In her autobiography, Mai Zetterling — the Swedish actress who came to Britain in 
1943 — noted: ‘I must have trudged, looking pathetic, through more bombed cities 
and rehabilitation camps than any other living actress’ (Zetterling 1985, 83). 
Zetterling played Lili in The Lost People: one of the DPs who comprise the ‘whole of 
Europe’ at which Captain Ridley gestures. She played Hildegard in Portrait From 
Life (1948): the woman in a portrait seen in a War Artists Exhibition by Major 
Lawrence (Guy Rolfe) which prompts his search through many DP camps to find 
her.16 Both women are victims of the Nazis, but neither film explores wartime 
experiences. Rather, the characters played by Zetterling stand for a generalised image 
of European suffering at the hands of the Nazis.  
 
Alongside its imagery of suffering The Lost People also shows chaos and 
division in constant quarrelling and squabbling within and between different national 
groups, particularly in conflicts over who had collaborated. The film may be careful 
to establish that the DPs are of a very wide range of European nationalities but it 
shows them sharing similar characteristics regardless of nationality — prone to 
shouting, hysteria, fighting and sometimes violence. Both The Lost People and 
Portrait From Life show DP camps teeming with desperate people and as places of 
black market activities, corruption and spying. In Portrait From Life, Major 
Lawrence’s narrative voice, describing his tour through a range of camps in search of 
Hildegard says that it is ‘like a nightmare’ 
 
Despite the efforts of the government, similar associations of DPs with 
wartime collaboration and black marketeering recurred in imagery of European 
Volunteer Workers (EVWs) — the name given to DPs from camps in Germany and 
Austria who were recruited to the British labour market in the late 1940s. In an 
unprecedented move, and one that was never subsequently extended to any other 
group of migrants, the Ministry of Labour attempted to shape public attitudes in the 
1940s through their interventions to secure favourable coverage in the media, setting 
up a Committee on Publicity for the Education of Popular Opinion on Foreign 
Workers in 1947.17 The Committee found that opinion about EVWs included the view 
that they were Fascists who had fought for the Germans, ‘some of the scum of 
Europe’ and ‘the Jews of Europe’.18  
 
An identification of EVWs as ‘the Jews of Europe’, despite the very limited 
numbers admitted under the scheme, drew on the history of anti-alienism in Britain in 
which the term ‘immigrant’ was widely used to mean Jews in the early part of the 
century and many migrant and refugee groups from Europe were seen as suspicious, 
threatening, and criminal foreigners (Cesarani 1993). Post-war media portrayals often 
drew on attitudes familiar from this history, but added distinctive inflections from 
post-war imagery. In 1947 the Daily Mirror, commenting both on DPs in Europe and 
those recruited to the British labour market, linked ideas of criminality and suffering. 
The paper portrayed DPs as a ‘great suffering lump of humanity … composed almost 
entirely of men and women who have run away from something’, arguing that they 
‘wouldn’t even be useful as labour, in England or anywhere else [as] they are broken 
people. One in four is a crook or has been made a crook by his suffering’.19A Daily 
Mirror editorial in 1948, under the headline ‘Let Them Be Displaced’, portrayed 
EVWs as criminals, but named them also as black marketeers.20 Doubts about the war 
records of EVWs were a consistent undercurrent in popular responses. As David 
Cesarani’s work demonstrates, war criminals of a range of nationalities did enter 
Britain under the EVW scheme (Cesarani 1997, Cesarani 2006, Chapter 6).  
 
The idea of Europe as criminal, corrupt and sinister is particularly evident in 
The Third Man (1949) — a film not only acclaimed by the critics but also the most 
popular film at British box-offices in 1949.21 Its themes of black marketeering, 
murder, spying and mysterious disappearances and its visual references to film noir 
evoke a sinister and shadowy world of danger, intrigue and moral bankruptcy. The 
opening narrative voice — that of the film’s director Carol Reed — identifies this 
world as the post-war condition of Vienna. Over shots of boots, stockings, cigarettes 
and watches changing hands, the narrator tells the audience: ‘I never knew the old 
Vienna before the war, with its Strauss music, its glamour and easy charm … I really 
got to know it in the classic period of the Black Market’. There is no glamour in the 
Vienna of the film — it is framed by sequences in cemeteries, and much of its action 
is set in seedy apartments, hotels and bars, dark streets and sewers. Its music is the 
sound of a solo zither, not Strauss.  Nor are the rackets only in cigarettes and watches. 
Holly Martens (Joseph Cottens) discovers that his old friend Harry Lime (Orson 
Welles) runs a racket stealing penicillin from military hospitals and watering it down, 
resulting in the deaths of children. Both Holly and the amoral Harry are American, but 
the film shows Holly losing his innocence through his journey to Europe and ends 
with him shooting his old friend in the sewers of Vienna. 
 
A generalised image of a continent that was suffering, chaotic and threatening 
increasingly incorporated Germany through attention to the suffering of Germans in 
the aftermath of war. The Save Europe Now campaign begun in September 1945 on 
the initiative of the publisher, Victor Gollancz, was particularly concerned with the 
millions of Germans who had become refugees at the end of the war through flight 
from the advance of Soviet forces and expulsion from Poland and Czechoslovakia. It 
publicised the German refugee crisis and the prospect of mass starvation among 
German refugees, raising the question of whether Germans were also victims of the 
war. In 1946 with the lifting of the ban on non-fraternisation, local campaigns invited 
German prisoners-of-war to spend Christmas in British homes.22 The plight of 
Germans was merged into a wider picture of European suffering by the Save Europe 
Now campaign which also drew attention to the millions in the wider continent who 
were in danger of perishing from hunger and cold during the winter (Frank 2006). In 
November 1945, the Archbishop of Canterbury, a supporter of Save Europe Now, 
appealed to the government to take further measures to save Europe ‘from dying in 
our hands’.23  
 
Despite the increasing tendency to blur distinctions between Germany and the 
rest of Europe in a common image of suffering and chaos, schemes for the relief of 
German suffering, like Save Europe Now, proved highly contentious. A Defeated 
Nation (1946) — a documentary about the administration of the British zone in 
occupied Germany, directed by Humphrey Jennings — begins with a dialogue 
between different voices expressing these views:  
 
‘What’s it like in Germany?’  
‘Must be terrible’.  
‘Well they’ve asked for it, they’ve got it’.  
‘Yes, but you can’t make them starve’. 
‘I don’t know about that. I’ve got a son out there. As far as I can see it would 
be a good thing if some of them die’.24 
 
These voices are scripted, but the letter-columns of newspapers and magazines 
offered a similar range of opinion. In Picture Post’s letter column in September 1945 
headlined ‘Should We Let Germany Starve?’views ranged from support for the ‘Save 
Europe Now to ‘let them suffer — they deserve to’. One female letter-writer deplored 
what she saw as ‘organised sympathy’ being launched only four months after the 
defeat of Germany with no mention of ‘similar and even worse conditions … in all 
the countries that have suffered from Teutonic aggression’. In contrast a man argued 
that: ‘The fact that those who are suffering so terribly are German makes no 
difference’.25 Attention to German suffering may have been a factor in the 
considerable decline in those who said they ‘did not like’ Germans in response to 
Gallup Polls. From their high-point of 59% in April 1946, they fell to 51% by October 
1946, but then declined steeply to 20% by summer 1947 when almost half of those 
polled stating that they were ‘sympathetic’ or had ‘no ill-feeling’.  
 
The relief of German suffering was also contentious in newspaper coverage 
where there were sharp divisions over whether Germans could be seen as victims. But 
even amongst those who thought Germans undeserving of any sympathy, there was 
increasing recognition that relief was necessary for the sake of Europe. In language 
where there was a notable slippage between Germany and Europe, the Daily Mirror 
advocated the need to solve the German refugee crisis, emphasising that this was ‘not 
out of any sympathy for the German people’, and highlighting this point through the 
headline: ‘Feed the Brutes?’ But it argued that: ‘The longer Europe is allowed to sink 
into the bog, the longer it will take to raise up — the longer the occupation will have 
to go on’.26 Other press coverage began to show Germans as victims. In a 
considerable revision of its position in April, the Times argued in September 1945: ‘It 
is surely not enough to say that the Germans brought these miseries upon themselves’. 
Speaking of ‘the universal chaos of Germany’ and the sufferings of Germans expelled 
from Poland, its correspondent commented: ‘brutalities and cynicism against which 
the war was fought are still rife in Europe, and we are beginning to witness human 
suffering that almost equals anything inflicted by the Nazis’.27  
 
The turn to an image of suffering Germany, however contentious the schemes 
for relief, meant that Germany was increasingly incorporated into the wider image of 
a suffering continent. But suffering itself took on a threatening meaning as the 
prospect of mass starvation in Germany prompted fears of disease, rioting, violence 
and anarchy. The Sunday Chronicle suggested that ‘for the sake of Europe and 
ourselves, for the safety of our occupying troops … Germany must be prevented from 
becoming a plague spot and a danger to the world’ (Frank 2006, 243). The Picture 
Post article that prompted Mrs. Jackson’s objections argued: ‘Europe can’t afford a 
dead Germany now, or the war that will certainly come later out of her economic 
chaos and bitterness’ (Jacobson, 1946). As peace was ushered in, the narrative of 
European suffering continued to associate the continent with the threat of war.  
 
The immediate post-war period could be regarded as a transitional moment 
between war and post-war for Britain as well as other European nations. Wartime 
conditions persisted. There were extreme shortages of food in Germany and continued 
and sometimes intensified rationing in Britain and France.28 The legacy of war was 
apparent in many other aspects of everyday life: housing shortages, bomb-sites, 
bereavements and divorce rates — which peaked in Britain in 1947, in France in 1946 
and in Germany in 1948. But British hardships could not be compared with conditions 
on the continent. In the late 1940s, as Europe was defined as much by its sufferings 
and its menace as by its civilisation, the wartime opposition between Britain and 
Germany often slid into a wider opposition between Britain and Europe: British 
stability and order against a war-torn and chaotic continent.  
 
‘Eastern’ Europe 
 
In 1954, in the context of debates about the rearmament of West Germany and 
its membership of the European Defence Council, the British government considered 
censoring an episode of the BBC’s first television series on the Second World War — 
War in the Air — which showed Germany as a militaristic power. Winston Churchill, 
Prime Minister in 1954, minuting that he had watched the ‘offending film’, stated: 
‘compared to the harm done by Lord Russell of Liverpool’s book it is trivial’.29 On 
the same day, apparently having difficulty in bringing himself to name the title of the 
book, he informed the Foreign Office: ‘Lord Russell of Liverpool’s book has already 
sold 60,000 copies and is being reprinted as fast as possible as the demand is very 
great’.30 The title of the book was The Scourge of the Swastika and, according to the 
preface, was ‘intended to provide the ordinary reader with a truthful and accurate 
account of many … German war crimes’ (Lord Russell 1954, viii). Earlier that year, 
the government had attempted to prevent its publication.31  
 
The government’s attempts at censorship in 1954 marked a dramatic shift in 
official ideas about Germany and its place in Europe. The introduction to the film 
shown to prisoners-of-war in 1945 had told them that their journey back to 
membership of the European family of nations would be neither short nor quick.32 
Nine years later, the government was committed to the speedy reinstatement of West 
Germany as a member of the European family. Its thinking about The Scourge of the 
Swastika was in the context of the Cold War and, as one official noted, a commitment 
to ‘controlled German rearmament, and to a policy which contains, as an important 
element, belief in the possibility of a free Germany reborn on democratic lines’.33 The 
book was therefore deemed ‘offensive’ because ‘there is no doubt that many Germans 
would now be frightfully hurt by this book’ and because ‘it does little good to rake 
over the ashes of the past’.34 Lord Salisbury, commenting on the proposal to censor 
the episode of War in the Air which showed Germany as a militaristic power, stated 
succinctly: ‘It is of course true that the Germans are a warlike nation. That is why we 
want them on the side of the West’.35  
 
In the 1950s, public memories of the Second World War, evoked most 
obviously in a prolific cycle of Second World War films, celebrated the national 
wartime record largely as a masculine military conflict with Germany. Nazi war 
crimes, genocide against the Jews and sufferings on the Eastern Front were all 
neglected. The Scourge of the Swastika devoted considerable attention to such themes, 
went through seven editions by 1955, and came out in paperback from Corgi in 1956. 
The initial demand for it, noted by Churchill, was probably fuelled by the 
considerable press coverage it received as a result of the government’s attempt to 
prevent its publication. Its popularity might also suggest an eagerness for alternative 
memories of war, beyond the standard fare of British-German conflict. But the 
publisher’s provision of a lurid yellow dust-jacket showing emaciated figures standing 
in the shadow of a huge pair of jackboots suggests that they anticipated another kind 
of interest. Billie Melman, tracing the development of an English popular culture of 
history from the nineteenth century, has noted that it was often perceived as ‘a place 
of … pleasurable horror’ (Melman 2006, 23). British schoolchildren made The 
Scourge of the Swastika into an illicit source of such pleasurable horror, passing it 
round classrooms under desks.36 Its black and white plates included pictures captioned 
‘shrunken heads found at Buchenwald’, ‘a mass grave at Belsen’, ‘a wagon-load of 
corpses at Buchenwald’, and ‘Polish women’s legs disfigured by human guinea-pig 
operations’. Some plates showed naked women. 
 
The Daily Express reported the attempt to ban The Scourge of the Swastika 
under the headline ‘Monstrous Act of Censorship’ and proceeded to serialise the 
book.37  Most newspapers reviewed it and affirmed the importance of remembering 
Hitler’s death camps, but a number also invoked Siberian labour camps.38 The onset 
of the Cold War involved a distinct shift eastwards in notions of barbarism, as the 
Soviet Union was identified as the principal Cold War enemy — a shift particularly 
apparent in the terms used for European geography. Announcing the descent of an 
‘Iron Curtain’ on the continent in his Fulton speech of 1946, Churchill had listed a 
wide range of capitals ‘in Central and Eastern Europe’ which were now behind this 
curtain. By 1954 the ‘Iron Curtain’ signalled a division between ‘East’ and ‘West’.  
 
Once the war was over, the Soviet Union’s wartime role, including its 
liberation of the death camps of Eastern Europe played almost no part in memories of 
war. In contrast, the Soviet Union’s post-war menace and corruption bulked large in 
the Cold War narrative. A report on public opinion polls in 1947 suggested that 
popular attitudes were slow to shift away from the wartime admiration for the Soviet 
Union repeatedly reported in wartime Home Intelligence Reports (Rose, 2005, 50-56). 
Anti-Russian feeling was hardening ‘slowly, painfully, but steadily’, it commented, 
while the large number of ‘don’t know’ responses to questions could be attributed not 
only to lack of interest but also hesitancy, in a context where news sources were 
distrusted as propagandist (Willcock 1948, 70-72). A year later, the story of the 
blockade of West Berlin and the Allied airlift clearly identified the Soviet Union as 
oppressor, but it was through news of ‘Eastern Europe’ that it was increasingly 
revealed as tyrant.  
 
In a striking comment on the invention of the idea of ‘Eastern Europe’ in the 
eighteenth century, Larry Wolff suggests that uncertainty over the geographical 
border between Europe and Asia ‘encouraged the construction of Eastern Europe as a 
paradox of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion, Europe but not Europe’ (Wolff 
1994, 7). The Cold War narrative told a similarly paradoxical story. A merger of the 
USSR and Nazi Germany in a common image of totalitarianism — ‘Red Fascism’ — 
has attracted the attention of scholars in both American and British contexts who trace 
it to the 1930s (Adler and Paterson 1970, Shaw 2001, Chapter 3). The invocation of 
Siberian labour camps in reviews of The Scourge suggests another merger that has 
attracted less attention. Behind the Iron Curtain were the brutality and oppression 
practised by anti-Christian totalitarian regimes, but also oppressed peoples who were 
deprived of European democracy and freedoms. ‘Eastern European’ nations acquired 
a double meaning: police states like the former Nazi Germany, but also places of 
suffering under Soviet oppression, like occupied Europe under Nazi rule.  
 
As barbarism was located in the east, ideas about Germany became 
increasingly ambiguous. Official attitudes that recast West Germany as ally were not 
always replicated in the media, but the Democratic and Federal Republics were 
generally distinguished in Cold War language — East and West Germany. 
Distinctions between their values were particularly apparent in an ongoing story about 
refugees, in which East Germany inflicted sufferings on its people, while West 
Germany provided asylum. In 1953, Norman Swallow, a BBC producer, was in the 
midst of making a television documentary on refugees for the Special Enquiry series 
when news broke of an East German uprising repressed by Soviet tanks. Despite the 
holiday that he was taking, he immediately wrote what he called a ‘business letter’ 
about plans for this documentary: ‘I feel we must cash in on the East Berlin riots in a 
big way. They fit well into the programme as being a more violent form of evidence 
than our refugees that the East German government drives people to desperate 
measures’.39 
 
Swallow had made a documentary on EVWs for the BBC in 1951 — I Was A 
Stranger — which portrayed refugee experiences as part of the brutal legacy of Nazi 
rule in Europe.40 His reaction to the East Berlin uprising demonstrates a shift of 
attention from the Nazi legacy to the Cold War. It also suggests that East Germany 
could take on the meaning formerly assigned to occupied Europe under Nazi rule: 
suffering under oppression and brave resistance. As the destination of most refugees, 
West Germany had a different meaning, exemplifying the freedom of the ‘West’. The 
final version of Swallow’s documentary noted that nearly 500,000 refugees had fled 
from the Soviet zone in the past four years, the majority of them in the previous six 
months. It claimed that ‘the story of Berlin’s refugees is probably the most awful 
human story in Europe at this moment’.41 A BBC Viewer Research Report found that, 
while there were a ‘few dissentients who feel no compassion for the sufferings of ex-
enemy peoples’, the majority reacted to the programme with ‘keen interest and 
approval’ and ‘as a rule the reaction was one of unreserved sympathy’.42 Second 
World War records were largely irrelevant to this story.  
 
The Man Between, set in Berlin, was released three months after the East 
German uprising and, like The Third Man, directed by Carol Reed. Dilys Powell’s 
review noted: ‘there is a world of difference between the baroque, decaying elegance 
which Reed discovered in the ruins of Austria and the cautionary carelessness of life 
which he has seen in Germany’.43 Even so, the films share imagery of a corrupt, seedy 
city characterised by criminality, rackets, spying and blackmail. Many reviews noted 
shared ‘Iron Curtain’ imagery, suggesting how far the Cold War shaped their 
memories of the earlier film, since they had made little mention of the ‘Iron Curtain’ 
at the time (Shaw 2001, 29). Picturegoer identified the star of The Man Between as 
‘Berlin itself, hysterical, suspicious, forever alive with menace’.44 But while 
corruption, suspicion and intrigue characterise West as well as East, the East is a 
particular place of danger and menace. The West is the British zone of occupation 
where Susanne (Claire Bloom) arrives from Britain on a visit to her brother — a 
Medical Officer working with the British army of occupation. In a film in which 
divisions of the city are prominent in the theme of border-crossings — by foot, by car 
and finally by laundry-van — it is men from the East who kidnap Susanne and take 
her to the Eastern sector. As she re-crosses the same border in the final sequence, 
travelling West, her German lover is shot in the back.  
 
Claire Bloom as Susanne in The Man Between has to cope with threats to her 
life in Germany, but as Susan in Innocents in Paris she faces no more than the 
advances of a middle-aged French man.45 Narratives of continental visits began to 
emerge quickly once the war was over. A Times editorial on the British holiday-maker 
in March 1946 was titled ‘the return to Europe’ and noted that ‘the first 
announcements of Continental readiness to greet foreign guests come from countries 
which have been spared the ravages of war’.46 Switzerland — neutral in the war — 
was the setting of the first post-war film about continental tourism — Passionate 
Friends (1949).47 But two films released in 1953 showed more modest excursions 
encompassing Britons of a range of social classes and ages. A Day to Remember 
showed a day trip to Boulogne by a darts team from a London pub.48 Innocents in 
Paris which showed a weekend trip, earned criticism from many reviewers for its 
clichéd representation of ‘gay Paree’ as ‘a city given up to a perpetual good time’ 
with ‘buckets of champagne’.49 Such a vision of what was ‘continental’ was familiar 
to viewers of BBC television’s Continental Café which featured international cabaret 
and champagne buckets and was introduced as ‘l’heure du champagne’ — although 
guests drank ginger ale.50 The ‘return to Europe’ reinstated ‘continental’ as sexuality, 
glamour and sophistication, in contrast to ‘Eastern Europe’ as a place of drabness, 
oppression and impoverishment, signified particularly by unglamorous and 
unfeminine women.   
 
A British officer in The Colditz Story (1955) — a film about British prisoners-
of-war in Germany — when reminded of the sufferings of occupied Europe, thanks 
God for the English Channel.51 The Cold War narrative never completely displaced 
attention to wartime Europe under Nazi rule, as the publication of The Scourge of the 
Swastika demonstrated. Although 1950s filmic images of the war were dominated by 
military conflict with Germany, the post-war persistence of the resistance narrative 
meant that British wartime involvement in continental Europe, German war crimes, 
and the courage of European resisters continued to resonate in British memories. But 
as menace and barbarism shifted eastwards, narrative of day-trips and weekend-trips 
to the continent identified a ‘Europe’ that excluded the ‘East’ and began to lose 
associations with war.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Mrs. Jackson was not alone in 1946 in hoping that she would hear no more of 
Germany and that the media would provide more entertaining fare than news from the 
continent. In the late 1940s attitudes in Britain to the recent war were complex and 
ambivalent and the peace was associated with austerity, difficulty, national exhaustion 
and sometimes with national decline (Zweiniger-Bargielowska, 2000). Films about 
the war were not popular in the last years of the war, and did not regain popularity 
until the 1950s. Even so, the centrality of Germany to late 1940s stories of the Nazi 
legacy in Europe meant that attentive media audiences could not avoid hearing a good 
deal about Germany. In the 1950s they heard even more, not only through war films 
which paid far more attention to Germany than to other former enemies, but also 
through the central place of Germany in the divided continent of the Cold War. 
 
One common thread ran through these diverse narratives of Germany: war, the 
legacy of war, the threat of future war. In the late 1940s, these were associated with 
the wider continent — the legacy of chaos and suffering itself threatening violence 
and further war. Ending a half-century in which the majority of journeys from Britain 
to the continent were for the purpose of war, they reinforced the idea of Europe as a 
place of danger and of threat to British lives. They cast Britain as champion of 
civilisation and bastion of stability against a war-torn continent.  
 
The moment when Britain was defined against Europe proved short-lived. 
Churchill’s Fulton speech of 1946 identified the ‘West’ mainly with the English-
speaking peoples — the United States, Britain and the Dominions — paying 
comparatively little attention to the continent. But the divided continent of the Cold 
War not only meant that the wartime vision of ‘Europe against the Germans’ 
increasingly receded, but also gave salience to the European dimensions of a ‘West’. 
By 1961 these European dimensions were significant to a new meaning of ‘Europe’ 
that gained currency in Britain in the context of the British bid to join the European 
Economic Community (EEC). But membership of the EEC, while hotly debated 
through the failed bids of the 1960s, had little relevance to a further meaning of 
‘Europe’ anticipated by narratives of excursions to the continent, foreshadowing the 
development of mass tourism in the 1960s. This ‘Europe’ had associations which Mrs. 
Jackson perhaps enjoyed: playground, not battlefield.  
* I would like to thank the Leverhulme Trust for the award of a Research Fellowship 
during which this chapter was researched and written. 
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